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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
parties intended the builder to be liable for an injury which did not arise out
of a defect in workmanship or material used.
Duty To Provide Safe Equipment
Section 240 (1) of the New York Labor Law provides that, "a person
employing or directing another to perform . . .painting.., of a building ...
shall furnish.., for the performance of such labor.., ladders ... so constructed
... as to give proper protection .... This statute imposes an absolute duty, the
breach of which renders the wrongdoer liable without regard to his care or
lack of it.3
The plaintiff in Klutz v. Citron,32 hired to paint defendant's home, was
provided with a ladder having a defective rung. Because the ladder was too
long, the plaintiff without defendant's permission, cut it into two parts and
used the section which possessed the weakened rung, from which he fell. The
majority of the Court (4-3) held that the plaintiff could not recover for he
did not meet his burden 33 of establishing that the employer or director failed
to provide him with a ladder which would afford proper protection. The
reasoning upon which this conclusion rested was that the injury resulted from an
entirely different defective ladder than the one provided by the homeowner.
The dissent cogently points out the confusion of the majority by stating
that, "the fact that plaintiff cut a piece from the ladder furnished by defendant
has nothing whatever to do with the case since that cutting was in no sense the
cause of or related to the accident." This is so because it was the defective rung
which was part of the ladder provided by the defendant, which was the cause
of the injury.
The Appellate Division.4 had reversed a judgment in favor of the defendant
because of an alleged error of the trial judge in his instruction to the jury that
it could find liability under section 240 only if it found that the defendant
supervised the doing of the work. Although the Court of Appeals evaded this
difficult issue by confusing another, it found it could not bypass the problem
completely. In passing, it stated that the plaintiff was not an employee, but an
independent contractor, and that there was no evidence that the defendant
directed the manner or method of painting his home but left it solely to the
judgment and experience of the plaintiff. In Koenig v. Patrick Construction
31. Koenig v. Patrick Construction Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948).
32. 2 N.Y.2d 379, 161 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1957).
33. Johnson v. Johnson, 249 App. Div. 859, 292 N.Y.Supp. 921 (2d Dep't
1937).
34. 1 A.D.2d 828, 953, 148 N.Y.S.2d 367 (2d Dep't 1956).
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Corp.,35 the Court determined that the statute placed its duty upon a corporation
which "hired" an independent contractor to wash the windows of a school it was
constructing. One wonders whether the corporation directed the method of
washing windows or left the manner to the washer's judgment and experience.
Furthermore, if we accept the Court's definition of "directing'-that is,
directing the method and manner of performance-then that word adds nothing
to the statute. The common definition of an employer as applied by the courts
is, one who controls the means of doing a particular job as well as the end.3 0
We have a statute placing a duty upon one who employs or upon one who
directs. An employer is one who directs the means. What then does the word
"direct" mean? We can give it its own significance by defining it as the
procuring of another to do the work, as was suggested by the dissenters.
The decision in holding that the plaintiff removed himself from the
protection of the statute by sawing the ladder in two, is in this writer's opinion,
error. However, the greater danger is that the Court's dictum as to the meaning
of the word direct will be applied to all future cases where the plaintiff is an
independent contractor. In all fairness it should be said that there are grounds
to question whether this statute is intended to be applied to private homeowners
when "employing" independent contractors or whether it is restricted to those
"employing" independent contractors or employees as a part of their business.37
Are we to place this absolute duty of providing safe equipment upon a homeowner
who has no ability to distribute the costs of proper protection in favor of an
independent contractor, one ostensibly in a business, who can distribute the costs
of safety through control of the price of his services? The Court was not
inclined to consider whether it would apply such an evaluation but instead
expressly left open for the future the question of the statute's applicability to
private homeowners "hiring" independent contractors.
Recovery Of Illegal Receipts
In Car' v. Hoy38 the plaintiff, having been convicted of a charge of violating
public decency39 for offering nude females as photography models, brought an
action in conversion for his receipts taken by the defendant-sheriff. The complaint
was dismissed on the grounds that the money taken and 'withheld from the
35. See note 31 supra.
36. See, e.g., Hexamer v. Webb, 101 N.Y. 377, 385, 4 N.E. 755, 757 (1886).
37. Cf. Sweeney v. Spring Products Corp., 257 App. Div. 104, 12 N.Y.S.2d
72 (1st Dept's 1939), aff'd, 282 N.Y. 685, 26 N.E.2d 814 (1940) where the court held
that the "employer" of an independent contractor was not liable under the
statute to an employee of the independent contractor.
38. 2 N.Y.2d 185, 158 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1957).
39. N.Y. PENAL LAw §43.
